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Abstract
A Schumpeterian growth model is constructed for an economy with wage
bargaining. It is shown that the economy is subject to cycles in which capital,
output and employment vary in fixed proportion. These increase through saving
and capital accumulation until a new technology is introduced, at which moment
they fall sharply due to obsolescence of capital. When the labour market is
deregulated to weaken workers’ position in bargaining, the labour-capital ratio
increases but the average growth rate of the economy decreases. The growth cycle
can be socially optimal. An elasticity rule is given for when the labour market
should be regulated and when deregulated.
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The purpose of this paper is to construct a model that would explain eco-
nomic growth with ﬂuctuations in output and employment. The study is
therefore closely related to theories of endogenous growth and real business
cycles (RBC). Aghion and Howitt (1992) shows that the introduction of
jump processes into general equilibrium models leads to endogenous business
cycles. In their original model, however, there is a perfect labour market, no
real capital, and the households were risk neutral. Aghion and Howitt (1998)
incorporated capital accumulation and W¨ alde (1999) risk averse households
into this model. Despite of these generalizations, it is still typical for this the-
ory that the economy generates output and employment cycles only outside
the balanced-growth path. We construct a model which generates such cycles
on the balanced-growth path, but in which there are constant equilibrium
levels for the labour-capital ratio and the productivity-adjusted wages.
Introducing endogenous shocks into a RBC model, W¨ alde (2002) showed
that the ’laissez faire’ economy and the social planner generate diﬀerent out-
comes. In his model, however, the economy is characterized by ’bang-bang’
development: because R&D is subject to constant returns to scale and the
same good is used in both R&D and capital accumulation, the ﬁrms either
do R&D or invest in real capital, but do not both. We assume that because
the ﬁrms also learn from each other, technological change in a single ﬁrm is
a function of R&D inputs of all ﬁrms in the economy. This means that ﬁrms
invest in R&D and real capital simultaneously and the economy holds on a
stationary state despite of endogenous technological shocks.
All papers mentioned above assume a perfectly competitive labour mar-
ket. To explain real business cycles, one should however focus on labour
market imperfections. This can be supported by the following stylized facts:
• The level of employment adjusts faster than real wages to a shock, not
vice versa as suggested by models with a perfect labour market.
• A shock that makes some of capital obsolete reduces the level of em-
ployment, rather than increases the labour-capital ratio to maintain
full employment as suggested by models with a perfect labour market.
• There is no trend for the rate of unemployment.
2Because at least in European countries wage bargaining is a major form
of labour market imperfection, we take it as a starting point. Following
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001), we call any measures of public policy that
increase (decrease) the workers’ relative bargaining power as labour market
regulation (deregulation). In addition to the construction of a business cy-
cle model, we also explain why it may not be in the government’s interest
to eliminate unemployment by deregulation. The paper is organized as fol-
lows. The structure of the economy is speciﬁed in section 2, technological
change in 3 and production and capital accumulation in 4. Section 5 in-
troduces agents, section 6 wage bargaining and section 7 constructs general
equilibrium. Welfare evaluations are carried out in section 8.
2. The sectors
The economy comprises of three sectors – two producing consumption and
investment goods from labour and capital, and a third sector doing R&D
by labour only. Firms of all sectors are subject to constant returns to scale.
A key feature of our model is the existence of two simultaneous forms of
technological change. First, the productivity of labour in the consumption-
good and investment-good sectors is a product of learning by investment at
the level of the whole economy. This eliminates the trend in the rate of
unemployment. Second, total factor productivity (TFP) in the consumption-
good sector is a random process in which a single ﬁrm can increase the
probability of change by its own R&D. This generates employment cycles.
There are two separate labour markets:1 one for the consumption-good
and investment-good sectors, and the other for R&D. In W¨ alde’s (2002)
model, the economy produces from labour and capital one good which is
used for consumption, for capital accumulation and as an input for R&D.
Resources can then be transferred between investment and R&D without
cost and the economy grows in a bang-bang manner, with savings being
allocated in either investment or R&D but not in both. Our study starts
from the assumption that R&D is less capital intensive than the production of
1Separate labour markets for the consumption-good and investment-good sectors would
not make any diﬀerence in the results.
3investment goods. We bring this speciﬁcation to the extreme, for simplicity,
and ignore the use of capital in R&D.
Another key feature of our model is that each household must decide
ex ante in which market it is going to supply labour. This discrete choice
of occupation implies that in equilibrium the expected wage (i.e., the wage
times the probability of employment) must be uniform in the economy. Wage
bargaining is possible in the production of consumption or investment goods,
because the marginal product of labour is there falling for given capital stock.
In the R&D sector, the marginal product of labour is constant, there are no
proﬁts, wages are competitively determined and there is no unemployment.
We assume that households hold shares only in those ﬁrms in which they
are not working.2 Given this, ﬁrms can be aggregated with their owners
into consumer-producer agents and the whole analysis can be carried out
in an extensive-game framework as follows. There is a ﬁxed number n of
agents that consume, produce, do R&D, invest in real capital and supply
labour to the other agents, taking wages and all macroeconomic variables
as given. At stage I, agents choose the sector where they supply labour; at
stage II, union-employer bargaining determines wages for the production of
consumption and investment goods; and at stage III, agents make the rest
of their decisions. This game is solved by backward induction in sections 5-7.
3. Technology
The productivity of labour in R&D is unity. Because of learning by invest-
ment and the spillover of this knowledge, the productivity of labour in the
production of consumption and investment goods, a, increases in in propor-


















2Alternatively, to obtain the same results, one could assume that there is a large number
of households which hold an equal but ignorable share of all ﬁrms.
3This assumption ensures that there is no trend for the rate of unemployment. The
economy would converge to full employment for ˙ a/a < E(dK/K), and unemployment
would increase indeﬁnitely for ˙ a/a > E(dK/K). See section 7.
4where ˙ a = da/dt, K = 1
n
P
k Kk and E is the expectations operator. A single
agent takes the productivity of labour, a, as ﬁxed.
We denote the expected wage for eﬃcient labour in the production of
consumption and investment goods by v. Because the agents choose ex ante
the market in which they supply labour, in equilibrium the expected wage
for physical labour, av, is uniform for the whole economy. This means that
in the R&D sector where there is no unemployment, the wage for physical
labour is equal to av. Since one unit of R&D services is produced from one
labour unit, the price for these services, p, is equal to the wage,
p = av. (2)
In the investment-good sector total factor productivity (TFP) is kept
constant, but in the consumption-good sector it is determined so that each
new technology increases the level of productivity by constant A > 1.4 In
other respects, the production function is the same for these two sectors.
This means that consumption and investment goods can be aggregated into
a single product so that with technology γ, TFP in the consumption-good
sector is given by Aγ but that in the investment-good sector is equal to unity.
We normalize the price of this product at unity.
Because there is externality in the R&D sector, agent j outcome in R&D
depends on both its own demand for R&D services, Zj, and the other agents’
demands, Zk for k 6= j. We specify this dependence in a CES form:5




































where n is the number of agents and µ the constant elasticity of substitution.
In a small period of time dt, the probability that R&D leads to develop-
ment of a new technology is given by Gdt, while the probability that R&D
4This discontinuous technological progress mechanism and the R&D technology pre-
sented later are borrowed from Aghion and Howitt (1992). Our speciﬁcation of the process
is to a large extent based on W¨ alde (2001).
5Given this speciﬁcation, the marginal product of R&D input, ∂G/∂Zj, is independent
of the number of agents, n, in the symmetric equilibrium Zj = Z−j = G/n.
5remains without success is given by 1 − Gdt:
dq =

1 with probability Gdt,
0 with probability 1 − Gdt, (4)
where q is the Poisson process resulting from R&D and dq is the increment of
this process. From this property it follows that ln Aγ+1 − ln Aγ = (lnγ)χ(t),
where χ(t) is the number of innovations between γ and γ+1. Because variable
χ(t) is Poisson distributed with parameter G, the average growth rate of the
level of productivity Aγ in the stationary state is given by6
E[log A
γ+1 − log A
γ] = GlogA, (5)
where E is the expectations operator.
The convenient feature of the model is that because the function (3) is
similar for all agents j = 1,...,n, there is only one stochastic process. This
does not however mean that a single agent j would ignore the eﬀect of its
R&D on the level of productivity. If the elasticity of substitution, µ, is
small enough, then agent j’s demand for R&D services, Zj, has a signiﬁcant
impact on the probability of technological change, G, given the other agents’
demand for R&D services, Z−j, even when the number of ﬁrms, n, is large.
In a symmetric equilibrium Zj = Z−j = Z = nG, the demand for R&D
services, Z, can be used as a proxy of the growth rate (5).
4. Capital accumulation
Each agent possesses a ﬁxed amount N of physical labour. Given TFP in
the consumption-good sector, Aγ, we obtain agent j’s budget constraint as:
A
−γCj + Ij + pZj = Πj + vaN, (6)
where Cj consumption, Ij investment in capital, Zj the demand for R&D,
p the price for R&D, Πj proﬁts from the production of consumption and
investment goods, va the expected wage for physical labour (which is uniform
for all sectors of the economy) and vaN expected labour income.
In the production of consumption and investment goods, agent j pays
the wage wj per eﬀective labour input, the productivity of labour is equal
6For this, see Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 59.
6to a, agents k = 1,...,n supply a
P
k(N − Zk) eﬀective labour units, agent
j employs Lj eﬀective labour units and the probability of being employed




k(N − Zk)]. The expected wage per eﬀective
labour input in these sectors, v, is then deﬁned by the sum of the wages, wj,













We assume, for simplicity, that capital is a stock of goods that does not
depreciate. Investment per unit of time dt then equals deterministic capital
accumulation, Ijdt = dKd
j. Solving for Ij from (6) and noting (2), we obtain
dK
d
j = Ijdt = [Πj + p(N − Zj) − A
−γCj]dt. (8)
R&D is directed at developing new production units. We assume that
after a successful development of new technology, a certain share s of the pre-
vious vintage can be upgraded which therefore has the higher productivity.7
The remaining share 1 − s of capital stock becomes obsolete. The capital
stock after successfully ﬁnishing an R&D project, ˜ Kj, is then given by the
current capital stock Kj as follows:
˜ Kj = sKj, 0 < s < 1. (9)
Given this deﬁnition, the entire capital stock belongs to the same vintage.
Noting (15), capital accumulation for agent j is given by
dKj = Ijdt + ( ˜ Kj − Kj)dq =

Πj + p(N − Zj) − A
−γCj

dt + ( ˜ Kj − Kj)dq.
(10)
This is a stochastic diﬀerential equation where uncertainty results from a
Poisson process q. During a small period of time dt, the capital stock of
vintage γ increases deterministically by investment in capital accumulation.
With a successful R&D project, dq = 1, capital stock jumps by ˜ Kj − Kj
and the level of productivity rises by A. When no investment in R&D takes
place or when R&D fails, the increment dq is zero, the level of productivity
does not change and there is no jump in capital stock Kj.
7This idea is from W¨ alde (2002).
75. Agents
Agent j employs Lj units of eﬀective labour at wage wj from the other agents
k 6= j and produces output Yj from input Lj and capital Kj through a twice-
diﬀerentiable production function Yj = F(Kj,Lj) with constant returns to
scale. Agent j’s proﬁt Πj is equal to output Yj minus labour costs wjLj:
Πj = Yj − wjLj = F(Kj,Lj) − wjLj. (11)
Agent j maximizes its expected utility over time by choosing its streams
of consumption, R&D and labour input, {Cj(τ),Zj(τ),Lj(τ)}, subject to
the accumulation of capital (10) and the stochastic process (4), given the
wage for its workers, wj, and the price for R&D services p. We denote the
constant rate of time preference by ρ > 0, the constant rate of risk aversion









j dτ s.t. (15) and (10). (12)
Because the agent is a risk averter, 0 < σ < 1 holds. Let f Kj, f wj and
e Γ = Γ( e Kj, e wj,p,γ + 1) be the values of Kj, wj and Γ after successfully
ﬁnishing an R&D project. Denoting ΓK
. = ∂Γ/∂Kj and noting (4), (10) and





Φ(Cj,Zj,Lj,Kj,wj,p,γ) . = C
σ
j + G[e Γ − Γ] + ΓKIj
= C
σ
j + G(Zj,Z−j)[Γ(f Kj,f wj, e p,γ + 1) − Γ(Kj,wj,p,γ)]
+





Maximizing (14) by labour input Lj is equivalent to maximizing proﬁts
Πj = Yj − wjLj by Lj. Given this, duality and the properties of the pro-
duction function Yj = F(Kj,Lj), proﬁt, output and labour input become
functions of capital Kj and the wage wj as:
Πj = max
Lj
[Yj − wjLj] = max
Lj
[F(Kj,Lj) − wjLj] = π(wj)Kj, π
0 < 0,
π
00 > 0, Lj = −π
0(wj)Kj, Yj/Kj = y(wj) . = π(wj) − wjπ
0(wj). (15)
8Cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).





We try the solution that consumption expenditure A−γCj is a share cj ∈ (0,1)
of income net of R&D, π(wj)Kj +p(N −Zj), and the value function is given
by Γ = Cσ
j /(cjrj), where cj and rj are constants. This and (16) imply
Cj = cjA
γ[π(wj)Kj + p(N − Zj)], ∂Cj/∂Kj = cjA
























π, rj = π(wj). (17)
Noting (3), (16) and (17), maximizing (14) by Zj yields
∂Φ
∂Zj
= (˜ Γ − Γ)
∂G
∂Zj






































In a bargain over the wage wj, the workers employed by agent j are organized
in a union which attempts to maximize their total wages Wj
. = wjLj, while
the management representing agent j attempts to maximize proﬁts Πj. We
assume, for simplicity, that both parties in bargaining take capital stock
Kj as given.9 The Generalized Nash product of an asymmetric bargaining is
then given by Λj
. = W α
j Π
1−α
j , where constant α ∈ (0,1) is the union’s relative
bargaining power. Given (15), this product takes the form










The outcome of bargaining is obtained through maximizing the product (19),
given capital stock Kj. We specify the production function so that there
9If these parties took also the eﬀect of the wage wj through capital accumulation
into account, then the union’s (management’s) target would be the expected value of
the stream of wages (proﬁts). Because in our model capital stock follows a cycle, the
mathematic solutions for such expected values would be very diﬃcult to obtain.
9exists a wage rate w which maximizes total wages wjLj, given capital stock
Kj.10 Otherwise, unions would have no incentive to raise wages above the
















> 0 for wj > w,
< 0 for wj < w. (20)
Maximizing (19) by wj is equivalent to maximizing (1/α)logΛj by wj.



















Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition totally and noting (15), (20) and
the second-order condition, we obtain that wages are uniform and that they
increase with the unions’ relative bargaining power:













Given symmetry across agents j = 1,...,n and equations (2), (3), (7), (9),
(15) and (17), we obtain
Kj = K, ˜ Kj = ˜ K = sK, Lj = L = −π
0(w)K, Zj = Z−j = Z = G/n,
wi = w, p = av = wL/(N − Z) = wπ
0(w)K/(Z − N), rj = r = π(w),
cj = c, πK + p(N − Z) = (π − wπ
0)K = y(w)K = Y,
Cj = C = cA



















10A good example of such technology is that the elasticity of substitution is one between
labour and capital, but raw materials (produced by other ﬁrms) are used in ﬁxed propor-





χ > 0, 0 < β < 1 and b > 0 are parameters. Then w = b/β > 0 obtains. For an ordinary
Cobb-Douglas function with b = 0, w = 0 obtains.
10Noting this, (9) and (17), we obtain
e Γ/Γ = (e C/C)
σ = (A e K/K)
σ = (sA)
σ. (23)
We assume that a technological change leads to the increase in welfare, e Γ > Γ,
since otherwise, there would be no incentive to do R&D. Given this and (23),
we can deﬁne a constant
θ . = e Γ/Γ − 1 = (sA)
σ − 1 > 0. (24)


























Solving for Z yields the demand for R&D as a function of the wage:











We denote the ratio of wages to proﬁts by δ and the elasticity of employment
with respect to the wage in production, when capital K is held constant, by














































> 0 ⇔ δ + /(1 + δ) > 1. (27)
Because in modern industries wages usually exceed proﬁts, wL > Π and
δ > 1, it is plausible to assume δ + /(1 + δ) > 1. The result then writes:
Proposition 1 Labour market regulation (deregulation), i.e., the increase
(decrease) in union power α, increases (decreases) the wage w and speeds up
(slows down) R&D and economic growth, Z(w) with Z0 > 0.
11Inserting (14), (17), (22), (24), (25) into (13) yields
ρ = C
σ/Γ + (e Γ/Γ − 1)G + [Y − wL + p(N − Z) − A
−γC]ΓK/Γ
= C
σ/Γ + θG + (Y − A
−γC)ΓK/Γ = cr + θG + (1/cj − 1)A
−γCΓK/Γ
= cr + θG + (1/c − 1)σC
σ/Γ = cr + θG + (1/c − 1)σcr
= cr + θG + (1 − c)σr = (1 − σ)cπ(w) + θnZ(w) + σπ(w). (28)
We assume that the propensity to consume c is less than one. Given propo-









From (22) and (29) it follows that consumption C is a function of the wage










The wage elasticity of consumption, when capital stock K and the number







The sign of this elasticity is ambiguous.
Given (10), (15), (22), (29) and (30), we obtain capital accumulation
dK = [Π + p(N − Z) − A
−γC]dt + ( ˜ K − K)dq
= [Y − wL + p(N − Z) − A
−γC]dt + ( ˜ K − K)dq
= (Y − A
−γC)dt + ( ˜ K − K)dq
= [y(w)K − A
−γC(w,K,γ)]dt + ( ˜ K − K)dq
= [1 − c(w)]y(w)K dt − (1 − s)K dq. (32)
This shows that because between moments of technological change the wage
w(α) is kept constant, capital stock grows at as ﬁxed rate. At the occurrence
of a technological change, total factor productivity TFP in the consumption-
good sector rises from Aγ to Aγ+1, capital stock falls from K to e K = sK,
and also employment falls in proportion to the decrease in capital K.
12The full employment constraint of the economy is given by N ≥ Z + L/a,
where N is the supply of physical labour, Z the demand for physical labour
in R&D and L/a, the demand for physical labour in the production of con-
sumption and investment goods. Noting (22), this implies
N − Z(w) ≥ L/a = −π
0(w)K/a. (33)
Noting (4), (22) and (32), the expected rate of capital accumulation reads:
E(dK/K) = (1 − c)y(w)dt − (1 − s)E(dq) = (1 − c)y(w)dt − (1 − s)Gdt
=

[1 − c(w)]y(w) − (1 − s)nZ(w)
	
dt.
If the rate E[dK/K] were greater than the growth rate of the productivity
of labour, ˙ a/a = (1/a)(da/dt), then both K/a and the right-hand side in
inequality (33) would increase and the economy would sooner or later end
up with full employment N − Z(w) = −π0(w)K/a. If E[dK/K] < ˙ a/a,
then K/a and the right-hand side in (33) would decrease and unemployment
N − Z(w) + π0(w)K/a would increase indeﬁnitely. An equilibrium rate of
unemployment exists only when equation (1) holds.
We assume, for convenience, that parameter s is close enough to one to
prevent the economy from attaining full employment.11 This means that at
the occurrence of a new technology γ, capital stock K falls so much that the
growth of capital before the occurrence of the next technology γ + 1 cannot
increase K to the level K = (Z − N)/π0(w). Given (22), he wage w(α),
the labour-capital ratio L/K = −π0(w), the output-capital ratio Y/K =
π − wπ0(w) and the level of R&D, Z(w), are then always constants. These
results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 The economy is subject to a business cycle where output,
capital stock and the level of employment increase in ﬁxed proportions until
a new technology is introduced, at which moment they sharply fall in propor-
tion to the share of capital stock that becomes obsolete. The average rate of
unemployment and the growth rate of the economy are kept constant.
11Otherwise, there would be switching between two regimes, one with unemployment
and the other with full employment, which would vastly complicate the model.
138. Social welfare
The government can determine the wage w(α) by regulating union power α.
Given (22) and (30), total income is determined by Y = y(w)K, aggregate
consumption by C(w,K,γ). The social planner maximizes the representative
agent’s expected utility over time by choosing w subject to capital accumu-
lation (32) and the stochastic process (4). The value of the planner’s optimal










. = ∂Ω/∂K and noting G = nZ(w) from (22) and proposition 1,





Ψ(w,K,γ) . = C(w,K,γ)









0 + (e Ω − Ω)nZ
0. (37)







where m is a constant. Equations (22), (24) and (38) produce
ΩK = σΩ/K, e Ω/Ω = (A e K/K)
σ = (sA)
σ = θ + 1. (39)
Inserting (39) into the Bellman equation (35) and (36), and noting (22), (29),
(38) and (39) yield
ρ = C
σ/Ω + nZ[e Ω/Ω − 1] + [yK − A
−γC]ΩK/Ω
= C
σ/Ω + nZ[e Ω/Ω − 1] + (1 − c)yKΩK/Ω = m + θnZ + (1 − c)σy.
12Cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
14Solving for m and noting (25) and (29), we obtain
m(w) . = ρ − θnZ(w) − [1 − c(w)]σy(w). (40)
Inserting (38), (39) and (40) into equation (37) and noting (15), (22),

















































































































Given π0 < 0 and proposition 1, α and w(α) should be increased (i.e.,
∂Ψ/∂w > 0) if and only if (41) is negative. This result can be rephrased as:
Proposition 3 The labour market should be regulated (deregulated), if









< 0 (> 0).
Given the propensity of consume, c(w), and the ratio of wages to proﬁts in
the production of consumption and investment goods, δ(w) . = wL/Π, the
labour market should be regulated (deregulated) the more likely, the lower
(higher) the wage elasticity of consumption, ε(w) . = (w/C)∂C/∂w, or the
lower (higher) the wage elasticity of employment, (w) . = |(w/L)∂L/∂w|.
This proposition is explained in the ﬁnal section. It shows that given the
propensity to consume, the wage elasticities of consumption and employment
as well as the labour share of income, the existence of regulation causing
involuntary unemployment may be optimal policy.
159. Conclusions
This paper examines growth and business cycles in an economy with im-
perfect labour markets. The theory of creative destruction, in which a new
technology renders an old technology obsolete, is taken as a starting point.
In other respects, the particular features of the model are the following:
• There exist separate labour markets for R&D and the rest of the econ-
omy. Labour suppliers choose between these two markets ex ante.
• In the production of consumption and investment goods, there is union-
employer bargaining over wages. The government can regulate or dereg-
ulate the labour market to increase (decrease) union power.
• The ﬁrms can increase the probability of a technological change in the
consumption-goods sector by R&D.
• Learning-by-investment increases the productivity of labour in the pro-
duction of consumption investment goods in proportion to the expected
accumulation of capital. This ’razor-edge’ condition ensures that there
is no trend for the rate of unemployment.
It is assumed, for simplicity, that there is perfect symmetry over the ﬁrms.
The main results and their interpretations are as follows.
Labour market deregulation decreases the rate of unemployment in the
consumption-good and investment-good sectors. This increases the expected
wage rate in these sectors and encourages the agents to shift their labour
supply from R&D to these sectors. Consequently, the level of R&D, the
number of innovations and the average growth rate of the economy will fall.
Vice versa with labour market regulation.
Capital stock swings up and down due to endogenous technological shocks.
Because wages are set by bargaining, the labour-capital ratio in production
is ﬁxed and output and employment swing in proportion to capital stock. A
typical cycle of the economy is as follows. Starting with some level of real
capital, new capital will be accumulated through savings in the economy and
some of the labour force will be allocated to R&D. At some point of time, a
new technology will be found, total factor productivity in the consumption-
good sector will rise but some of the outstanding capital stock will become
16obsolete. Capital stock (as measured in terms of the newest technology) will
fall sharply and start accumulating again.
Labour market regulation has two opposite eﬀects on welfare. First, it de-
creases employment and the expected wage in the production of consumption
and investment goods, which makes people to supply more labour to R&D.
With larger R&D, there will be faster economic growth. On the other hand,
regulation decreases output and the level of current consumption the more,
the higher the wage elasticities of consumption and employment are. If these
elasticities are low enough, then the latter eﬀect will be weak enough to
be outweighed by the former and the labour market should be regulated.
Otherwise, the labour market should be deregulated.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly stylized
mathematical model is used to draw conclusions about growth and business
cycles, the following judgement nevertheless seems to be justiﬁed. With
labour market regulation, a stationary state equilibrium with involuntary
unemployment, employment cycles and stable real wages can be possible. If
growth and income eﬀects of regulation are properly taken into account, such
an equilibrium may even be socially optimal.
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